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2
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LET'S DANCE

Georgia has become the forty-fourth state to model its new evidence
rules on the Federal Rules of Evidence.' The new code will go into
effect on January 1, 2013,4 150 years from when Georgia's first legal
code was published.' Passage of the 2013 Georgia Evidence Code did
not come easy, but was a product of years of debate, compromise, and
vetting from legislators, the judiciary, academia, and members and
groups of the practicing bar. The new code is largely derived from the
Federal Rules of Evidence, but Georgia has retained a significant
amount of evidence rules from its prior code and rejected certain
provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence. This Article reviews the
history of Georgia's evidence rules and the efforts to amend them,
summarizes the changes between the current Georgia Evidence Code

3. Ga. H.R. Bill 24, Reg. Sess. [hereinafter HB 241 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of O.C.G.A. tits. 24 to 35 (Supp. 2011)) (effective Jan. 1, 2013), available at
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislationlen-US/display.aspx?Legislation=31996; see also 6 JACK
B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE T-1 [Mar. 2010]
(Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2011) (reporting that at the time of publication forty-two
states have modeled their rules on the Federal Rules of Evidence). Illinois was the fortythird state to adopt an evidence code derived from the Federal Rules of Evidence,
approving new rules on September 27, 2010, which became effective on January 1, 2011.
See Special Supreme Court Committee on Evidence, IN RE ILLINOIS RULES OF EVIDENCE,

MR 24138 (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Evidence/Evide
nce.pdf. California, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, and Virginia are the six
states that have not adopted the framework of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 6
Around 2002, the California Law Revision
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra at T-8.
Commission ordered a study to determine whether its evidence code should be amended
to conform to the Federal Rules "either to improve the California rule or for the sake of
uniformity." CaliforniaLaw Revision Commission, COMPARISON OF EVIDENCE CODE WITH

2002-41
(Aug. 29, 2002), http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/2002/MM02-41.pdf. The background study
consisted of a series of discrete parts, with the final installment being submitted to the
FEDERAL RULES: INTRODUCTION OF STUDY AND DEFINITION OF HEARSAY, MEMO

commission in 2009. Miguel A. M~ndez, IX GeneralProvisions:Conformingthe California
Evidence Code to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 44 U.S.F. L. REV, 891, 892 (2010).
However, the project is apparently on hold. See California Law Revision Commission,
REVIEW OF CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE CODE (last updated Nov. 19, 2009), http://www

.clrc.ca.gov/K200.html#Minutes. Massachusetts has not adopted a set of rules of evidence
but encourages the use of the MASSACHUSET'PS GUIDE To EVIDENCE (Feb. 2011),

The guide is
http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/guide-to-evidence/massguidetoevidence.pdf
organized and numbered like the Federal Rules of Evidence and includes notations in every
section that explain when the rules are identical or similar to the Federal Rules of
Evidence or how they depart from them. See id.
4. Ga. H.R. Bill 24 § 1, 11.19-21.
5. See PAUL S. MILICH, GEORGIA RULES OF EVIDENCE § 1:1 (2010).
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and the 2013 Georgia Evidence Code, and explains the notable differences between the 2013 Georgia Evidence Code and the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
II.

GOLDEN YEARS: THE HISTORY OF GEORGIA'S EVIDENCE CODE

Creation of Georgia'sEvidence Code

A.

National Codification Movement. In 1858, the Georgia
1.
General Assembly appointed three commissioners to draft a condensed
legal code that embodied the laws of Georgia as then recognized by
Georgia courts, including the rules of evidence.' The push for codification in Georgia "was a product of the national codification movement of
the mid-19th century."' Many states' rules were based on decisional
law, and where state statutory collections did exist in the early
nineteenth century, they were arranged either chronologically with no
regard to subject matter or by broad topics that became confusing over
time.' Several states looked to improve the compilations of their laws
through codification during this time, including New York, Virginia,
Alabama, Kentucky, and Georgia.'
The merits of codification were hotly debated in the various states. 0
Opponents questioned whether codification could even be accomplished,
criticized the cost, and proclaimed that a code would result in upheaval
and confusion, though these criticisms were unsupported by specific
authority." Proponents pointed out the obvious advantages that a code
offered, namely that a simplified set of laws organized into chapters and
titles and condensed to reduce redundancies in existing law would "place
[the laws] within the knowledge of the citizens of the State," or in other
words, make them more accessible.' 2 Georgia legislators recognized

6. Id.; Givens v. Ichauway, Inc., 268 Ga. 710, 716, 493 S.E.2d 148, 154 (1997)
(Fletcher, P.J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Judge David Irwin was one of the three
commissioners and prepared the Code of Practice, which included the evidence rules.
MILICH, supra note 5.
7. MILICH, supra note 5; see generally Erwin C. Surrency, The Georgia Code of 1863
and Its Place in the Codification Movement, 11 J.S. LEGAL HIST. 81 (2003).

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Surrency, supra note 7, at 83, 85.
Id. at 85-89.
Id. at 83-86.
Id. at 84, 86.
Id. at 87 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); MILICH, supra note 5.
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that a simplified code would allow its citizens to secure a "more speedy
and certain attainment of the ends of justice."1
2. Enactment of the Georgia Code. The commissioners finished
drafting Georgia's first legal code in 1860 and met with a committee of
the General Assembly to examine the proposed code section by section. 14 The code was derived from several sources, including the
following: Georgia common law, the Georgia Constitution, Georgia
statutes, Georgia Supreme Court decisions, English statutes, the civil
and canon law of England (to the extent they were recognized in
Georgia), Blackstone's Commentaries," Professor Simon Greenleaf's
D-eatise on the Law of Evidence, and interestingly, Alabama's code."
It was divided into four parts, and the evidence provisions were included
in Part III, the Practice Code." Many of the evidentiary principles in
the proposed code were taken from the contemporary texts of that time
period with a few of the evidence sections being taken from then-existing
Georgia statutes.19
The General Assembly committee made some modifications to the code
and recommended that the legislature accept it as edited without
attempting to dissect it again section by section.2 0 The General
Assembly accepted this suggestion and adopted the code as drafted in
1860 with an effective date of January 1, 1862.21 However, the code
was not published until 1863 (Code of 1863 or Code) due to the Civil
War and a resulting shortage of "quality paper stock," and the Code was
further changed in the interim.22 One author noted that "[ilt can be
13. Surrency, supra note 7, at 87 (internal quotation marks omitted); Resolution of Dec.
20, 1847, 1847 Ga. Laws 311.
14. Surrency, supra note 7, at 90. Before meeting with the committee, the commissioners gathered in Atlanta to go through the proposed code by themselves, section by section,
with sessions lasting from 8:00 a.m. until evening every day of the week until the task was
completed. Id.
15. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765).
16. SIMON GREENLEAF, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1883).
17. Surrency, supra note 7, at 89, 98 (reporting that the sponsor of the bill calling for
a commission to be formed to draft a code stated that the code was to be "modeled if
practicable, upon the present code of Alabama") (internal quotation marks omitted); Act
of Dec. 9, 1858, 1858 Ga. Laws 95; MILICH, supra note 5.
18. Surrency, supra note 7, at 92, 94.
19. Id. at 95.
20. Id. at 90.
21. Id.
22. MILICH, supra note 5; Surrency, supra note 7, at 96; Paul S. Milich with
Introduction by Robert D. Ingram, A Brief Overview of the Proposed New GeorgiaRules of
Evidence, GA. B.J. 30, 31 (Aug. 2007) [hereinafter Milich & Ingram]. The Code of 1863 is
also referred to as Cobb's Code, after Thomas R. Cobb, one of the commissioners. See id.
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claimed that practice in the Georgia courts was definitely simpler than
practice in other jurisdictions at that period" as a result of the codification of Georgia's evidence rules.23
B.

Problems with the Georgia Evidence Code Over Time
The Georgia Evidence Code as currently drafted is derived from the
Code of 1863, but it has been amended and reorganized, and new
statutes have been enacted over time." Courts have filled in the gaps
inevitably left by an abbreviated code and tackled unforeseen developments through common law, sometimes with inconsistent applications." The new amendments, statutes, and common law have resulted
in an unwieldy body of law that has produced the same criticisms noted
above that prompted the enactment of Georgia's code in the first place,
including disorganization, inconsistency, and inaccessibility.26 Critics
also claim that the Georgia Evidence Code is antiquated and, as a result
of the foregoing, is cost-prohibitive, which can lead to unjust results.2 7
1. Disorganization and Inconsistency Resulting in Inaccessibility. One criticism voiced about the Georgia Evidence Code is its
organization. 28 Though most of the evidence rules are found in Title 24
of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), 29 over 100
evidence statutes are found in other titles of the Code.o Statutes

23. See Surrency, supra note 7, at 95.
24. Video: GeorgiaHouse of Representatives Judiciary Committee Proceedings (Feb. 8,
2011),33m,availableathttp://wwwl.legis.ga.gov/legis/2011_12/house/Committeesjudiciary/judyArchives.htm [hereinafter Feb. 8, 2011 House J. Comm. Video] (remarks by Rep.
Wendell Williard (R-49th)); MILICH, supra note 5; Milich & Ingram, supra note 22, at 31;
see also Daniel Hendrix et al., Recent Development, Evidence, 27 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 2
(stating that "[t]he last major revision of the Georgia Evidence Code, Title 24, was enacted
in 1863").
25. MILICH, supra note 5; Milich & Ingram, supra note 22, at 31.
26. See, e.g., MILICH, supra note 5.
27. Id.; see also Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 2-3; Feb. 8, 2011 House J. Comm.
Video, supra note 24, at 47m (remarks by Thomas M. Byrne).
28. MILICH, supra note 5.
29. O.C.G.A. tit. 24 (2010 & Supp. 2011).
30. MILICH, supra note 5, § 1:1 & appx. (listing approximately 106 evidence statutes
in titles 3, 5, 7, 9-11, 15-17, 19-20, 22, 26, 29, 31, 33-34, 40-46, 48-53).
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addressing the same subject matter can be found in various titles,
increasing the risk that they may be overlooked.
Moreover, courts have created new evidence rules through common
law. 32 Photography, telephone records, computer-generated documents,
and online social networking sites are all developments that have come
into existence since the Code's enactment." The Georgia Evidence
Code can be applied for some of these developments, but not all.3 1
Moreover, in some cases, courts have nearly abandoned the evidence
statutes altogether.3 s As a result, "'the rule' is not necessarily found
in the statutes," and the cases that have swallowed or abrogated the rule
are not always consistent.3 6 The resulting disorganization and inaccessibility imposes additional costs on an already overburdened trial and
appellate system..
2. The Georgia Evidence Code is Outdated. Critics of the
Georgia Evidence Code have also argued that the rules are outdated.
Indeed, the 2011 Evidence Study Committee Chair, Thomas M. Byrne,
went so far as to state that "[ilt's not hypercritical to say that Georgia
has the most antiquated and worst set of evidence statutes and lore of
any of the fifty states."" For example, under Georgia law, hearsay is
treated as "illegal testimony," and a party cannot waive an objection to

31. Id. For example, evidentiary statutes dealing with privileges are, for the most part,
in Title 24. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 24-9-20 to -30 (2010) (specifying qualified communications
between husband and wife, attorney and client, psychiatrist and patient, and with
clergyman, etc. are privileged). However, some are included in other titles. See, e.g.,
O.C.G.A. §§ 43-3-32 and 43-39-16 (2011) (accountant-client privilege and patient-licensed
psychologist privilege).
32. MILICH, supra note 5.
33.

Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 2-3. Paul Milich, Court Rules Will Benefit Public,

Op-Ed., ATLANTA J. CONST., May 26, 2011, at A19.
34. Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 2-3 (citation omitted) (noting that the evidence
statutes do not deal with photo and video evidence). When confronted with new
technologies, courts have utilized common law principles. See, e.g., Almond v. State, 274
Ga. 348, 349, 553 S.E.2d 803, 805 (2001) (stating that the record reflected that the digital
"pictures were introduced only after the prosecution properly authenticated them as fair
and truthful representations of what they purported to depict" and "[wle are aware of no
authority, and appellant cites none, for the proposition that the procedure for admitting
pictures should be any different when they were taken by a digital camera").
35. Milich & Ingram, supra note 22, at 31.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. See, e.g., MILICH, supra note 5; Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 2-3.

39. Feb. 8, 2011 House J. Comm. Video, supra note 24, at 44m (remarks by Thomas M.
Byrne).
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this kind of evidence at trial.4 0 Thus, a party can successfully appeal
a ruling or verdict based on hearsay even if considered or admitted
without objection, leading to added costs for the courts and parties by
allowing a party to appeal and retry a case.4 1 Georgia is the only state
to consistently and pervasively apply this rule, even as recently as 2011;
the overwhelming majority of states hold that inadmissible hearsay can
be considered and uphold a verdict when no objection is made."
Moreover, some of the exceptions to common law evidence rules
developed by Georgia courts are inconsistent with, or have become
nonexistent in, other states' rules.43 For example, many states have
deleted the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule from their evidence
rules." Res gestae is Latin for "things done" and is an exception
created to allow in as evidence spontaneous statements made by an outof-court declarant about an event occurring near the time of the event
as evidence." The Georgia Evidence Code retains this exception, which

40. Smith v. State, 123 Ga. App. 269, 271, 180 S.E.2d 556, 558 (1971) ("Hearsay
testimony (illegal testimony) has no probative force whatsoever, and its only effect is to
prejudice the minds of the jury against the party against whom such hearsay evidence is
introduced, and, this being so, the question of waiver by failing to file a timely objection
does not arise.") (quoting Rushin v. State, 63 Ga. App. 646, 647-48, 11 S.E.2d 844, 845
(1940)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. See id.; Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 3 (citation omitted).
42. See generally, J.A. Bock, Annotation, Consideration, in Determining Facts, of
Inadmissible Hearsay Evidence Introduced Without Objection, 79 A.L.R.2d 890 (1961 &
Supp. 2010). Texas and New York are two other states that follow the minority rule, albeit
inconsistently, that hearsay cannot support a verdict even where admitted without
objection. Id. at §§2, 28-29. New York has applied the minority rule as recently as 1998,
but a cursory review of the cases from it and other minority-rule states indicate that the
modern trend in these jurisdictions is to follow the majority rule, except in Georgia. See
id. at §§ 28-30; compare Boise St. Car Co. v. Van Avery, 103 P.2d 1107, 1115 (Idaho 1940)
(reversing verdict based entirely on hearsay), with Phillips v. Erhart, 254 P.3d 1, 6 (Idaho
2011) (inadmissible hearsay could be considered by jury where evidence was admitted
without objection). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit follows the
majority rule: "[It is clear that [a party, even where the declarant is its own witness] is
Even in a court of law, if
bound by answers that are hearsay, if not objected to ....
evidence of this kind [hearsayl is admitted without objection, it is to be considered, and
accorded its natural probative effect, as if it were in law admissible." Morris v. U.S., Dep't
of Treasury, 813 F.2d 343, 347-48 (11th Cir. 1987) (emphasis omitted).
43. Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 3.
44. Id.; Milich & Ingram, supra note 22, at 32.
45. Thompson v. State, 166 Ga. 512, 516, 143 S.E. 896, 900 (1928) (Russell, C.J.,
dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-3 (2010) ("Declarations accompanying an act, or so nearly connected
therewith in time as to be free from all suspicion of device or afterthought, shall be
admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae.").
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has been "'a source of confusion, consternation, and cost in our courts'
because there is no consistent body of law on the subject."'
An example of an exception maintained by Georgia courts not found
in any other state is the "bent of mind" rule."8 Georgia generally
prohibits the use of character evidence to show that a person acted in
conformity with their alleged character at the time in question, or in
other words, Georgia prohibits the use of extrinsic act evidence to show
a propensity for acting a certain way."9 The bent of mind exception
essentially swallows the rule by allowing a court to admit evidence of a
person's "'predispositionto commit a crime because they committed [it]
before' as 'proof of character in order to show action in conformity
therewith."'so
One consequence critics have cited of maintaining rules that are not
uniform or consistent with other states is that companies may be
discouraged from doing business in Georgia because they do not "know
what they'll get" if they have to go to court in Georgia." Additionally,
"[wiith the liberalization of pre-trial discovery, growth in the use of
experts, and the increase in the education and experience of the average

47. Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 3 (citing Student Observation of the Senate
Committee Meeting (Apr. 15, 2010) (remarks by Prof. Paul Milich) (on file with Georgia
State University Law Review)).
48. MILICH, supra note 5, § 11:13; see also Wade v. State, 295 Ga. App. 45, 48, 670
S.E.2d 864, 866 (2008); see, e.g., Hansen v. State, 205 Ga. App. 604, 606, 423 S.E.2d 273,

275 (1992) (holding that prior incidences of drunk driving were admissible to demonstrate
"the defendant's motive, bent of mind, and propensity for committing the same type of
offense. It was to show, as the court noted, that Hansen engaged in this type of conduct,
i.e., driving after drinking alcohol without exigent circumstances, so as to discredit his
version, that he would not have driven without the perceived threat to his safety. There
was a legitimate purpose for the other-crimes evidence.").
49. MILICH, supra note 5, § 11:1; O.C.G.A. § 24-2-2 (2010); Farley v. State, 265 Ga. 622,
628, 458 S.E.2d 643, 648 (1995) (Sears, J., specially concurring) (footnote omitted)
("Character evidence is excluded because a jury must determine a defendant's guilt or

innocence based solely on evidence relevant to the crime charged, and not based on a belief
that the defendant has a criminal character or a general propensity to commit bad acts.").
50.

Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 4; Video: Georgia House of Representatives

Judiciary Committee Proceedings(Mar. 2, 2009), 34m [hereinafter Mar. 2, 2009 House J.
Comm. Video] (remarks by Jack Martin, Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers)
(video on file with Georgia State University Law Review); see also MILICH, supra note 5,
§ 11:13 (noting that there is very little "difference between a person's 'bent of mind' and
his 'character' or between a person's 'course of conduct' and his propensity to act a certain
way"); Farley, 265 Ga. at 629, 458 S.E.2d at 649 ("Unfortunately, over the years courts
have applied and expanded the exception to the rule prohibiting evidence of an
independent act or crime to the extent that the exception often swallows the rule.").
51. Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 4 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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juror, the pressure has been to open up the trial-to let in more evidence,
more efficiently. 5 2
C.

Efforts to Amend the Code
Efforts to resolve these problems and modernize and amend the
Georgia Evidence Code on a broad scale began in the 1980s, and
ultimately, a collective voice emerged to amend and pattern Georgia's
Evidence rules after the Federal Rules of Evidence.
1. History of Federal Rules of Evidence. The Federal Rules of
Evidence were enacted in 1975, almost fifteen years after Chief Justice
Earl Warren appointed a Special Committee on Evidence to study the
feasibility and desirability of a uniform set of evidence rules for the
federal courts in 1961." University of Georgia Professor Thomas Green
prepared a report (Preliminary Study of the Advisability and Feasibility
of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts) for the
Special Committee, recommending that uniform rules be adopted as both
feasible and desirable." In his analysis, Green cited frustrations with
the law of evidence as voiced by noted legal scholars, lawyers, and
judges, including complaints that the law was "too extensive, too
complex, [too voluminous], and too uncertain to apply accurately on the
spur of the moment," had "uncorrelated and conflicting precedents," had
"infinitesimal, meticulous, petty elaboration into a mass not capable of
being perfectly mastered and used by everyday judges and practitioners,"
and that "[ulniformity and simplicity [was] the only cure."5 6
The report was ultimately submitted to an Advisory Committee, and
in 1965, the Advisory Committee began to draft what would become the

52.

Paul S. Milich, The Proposed New Georgia Rules of Evidence, ST. B. GA. NEWS,

www.gabar.org/public/pdf/news/proposed new evidence-rulesmilich.pdf (last visited Oct.
22, 2011).
53. Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 5.
54.

Edward J. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6

REv. LITIG. 129, 133 (1987); see COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 30

F.R.D. 73, 81 (1962) [hereinafter Special Committee on Evidence Report] (reporting that
a recommendation that uniform rules of evidence be formulated was suggested as early as
1938 and several times thereafter).
55. Special Committee on Evidence Report, supra note 54, at 79, 114. The Special
Committee was the first among a series of committees to evaluate the adoption of a
uniform set of federal rules. Imwinkelried, supra note 54, at 133.
56. Special Committee on Evidence Report, supra note 54, at 109-10 (citations omitted)
(reporting that two professors complained "a picture of the hearsay rule with its exceptions
would resemble an old-fashioned crazy quilt made of patches cut from a group of paintings
by cubists, futurists and surrealists").
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In 1972, the United States Supreme
Federal Rules of Evidence.
Court approved the rules, 58 but the Federal Rules of Evidence were not
enacted until 1975 after both the House and Senate conducted studies
of the rules." There have been several amendments to the Federal
Rules of Evidence since their adoption. The Federal Rules consist of
sixty-seven individually numbered rules that are divided among eleven
articles: Article I (General Provisions), Article II (Judicial Notice), Article
III (Presumptions in Civil Actions and Proceedings), Article IV (Relevancy and Its Limits), Article V (Privileges), Article VI (Witnesses), Article
VII (Opinions and Expert Testimony), Article VIII (Hearsay), Article IX
(Authentication and Identification), Article X (Contents of Writings,
Recordings, and Photographs), and Article XI (Miscellaneous Rules).
Since their adoption, "[t]he Federal Rules have been praised for their
accessibility," straightforwardness, specificity, and organization, allowing
attorneys to use them easily at trial."o Indeed, supporters who argued
for adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence in some form in Georgia have
stated that such an adoption would "mean[I better justice, fewer errors,
[and] fewer retrials."' These Georgia proponents have also pointed out
that the Federal Rules of Evidence "provide great flexibility regarding
contemporary media to introduce at trial" and would "encourage[]
companies to move to and invest in Georgia" because "Georgia state
courts would be in conformity with the federal courts of the United
States" and many other state courts.62 They have also noted the
following:
Achieving uniformity of the rules with the rest of the country would
also facilitate the practice of attorneys who try cases across state lines
and increase predictability. [Moreover], because all Georgia law
students are trained and taught the [Federal Rules of Evidence],
adopting them would be relatively swift and intuitive, with minimal retraining cost. Further, ongoing cost would be less than under the
current [Georgia Evidence Code] because of a reduced need ... for
retrials based on improperly admitted evidence.'

57. Milich & Ingram, supra note 22, at 31.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted); Mar. 2,
2009 House J. Comm. Video, supra note 50, at 34m (remarks by Jack Martin, Georgia
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers) (emphasis added)).
62. Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 14-15.
63. Id. at 15 (citations omitted).
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2. Early Efforts to Amend the Georgia Evidence Code (19861991). Since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Georgia
has incrementally adopted some Federal Rules, either in whole or in
part, and Georgia courts have applied some of the Federal Rules even
when there was no explicit analog in the Georgia Evidence Code."
When a specific code section is substantially similar or identical to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, Georgia courts have looked to interpretations
of the applicable rule by federal courts and those states that adopted the
same rules."
Concerted efforts to reform the Georgia Evidence Code and conform it
to the Federal Rules of Evidence began in 1986.66 Then Georgia Bar
President Bob Brinson formed an Evidence Study Committee, and its
members wrote a set of rules that was introduced in the General
Assembly in January 1989 after being passed by the State Bar of
Georgia Board of Governors.
The senate voted unanimously to
approve the bill, but the House Judiciary Committee held up the bill, so
it was never considered on the house floor.6 ' The Board of Governors
again passed a bill proposing to amend the Georgia Evidence Code in
1990, which was introduced in the General Assembly in January
1991." The senate approved the bill with only a few dissenting votes,
but the bill was held up in the House Judiciary Committee once again
and never reached the house floor."o The Evidence Study Committee
Chair, Frank C. Jones, attributed the failure to get the bill passed to
opposition primarily from the speaker."
3. Recent Efforts to Amend Georgia Evidence Code (2003Present). The Evidence Study Committee was re-formed in 2003 and
in 2005 began "informing and obtaining input from lawyers across the

64. See Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 61 MERCER L.
REV. 135, 143-44, 150 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 Treadwell].
65. See, e.g., Allen v. State, 286 Ga. 392, 395, 687 S.E.2d 799, 802 (2010).
Because the language of [O.C.G.A.] § 24-9-84.1(b) mirrors that of Rule 609(b) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the statutes based on Rule 609(b) that have
been enacted by several other states, we look for guidance to the judicial decisions
of the federal courts construing Rule 609(b) and the courts of our sister states
construing their statutes modeled on Rule 609(b).
Id.
66. Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 5.
67. Milich & Ingram, supra note 22, at 30; Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 5.
68. Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 5.
69. Id.
70.

Id.

71.

Milich & Ingram, supra note 22, at 30.
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state about the proposed changes" to the Georgia Evidence Code through
presentations and meetings. 2 In 2008, a joint legislative committee
produced the first draft of House Bill (HB) 24." HB 24 received strong
opposition from solicitors and prosecutors, and thus the committee did
not proceed further. 4
In 2009, efforts renewed again and, in an attempt to meet the
concerns that had stymied the bill in 2008, the head of the Georgia
Association of Solicitors-General was added to the Evidence Study
Committee to revise the bill." The committee discussed the differences
between the Georgia Evidence Code and the Federal Rules of Evidence
and, just as the commissioners did with the Code of 1983, analyzed the
proposed rules section by section." The bill was again introduced in
the house, and the Committee on Judiciary considered several amendments, some of which passed and some of which failed." Prosecutors
still voiced criticisms about the bill and specifically noted concerns about
"potential changes to existing Georgia policy, training cost, lack of
uniformity with the language of the [Federal Rules of Evidence], and
even disput[ed] the amount of support across the state for the reform
effort."" Prosecutors also voiced opposition to the bill's proposal to
remove the "bent of mind" exception to the character evidence rules and
replace it with Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 9 which would not
permit the state to admit evidence of similar DUI transactions as the
bent of mind exception permitted.o With these concerns voiced, the bill
never came before the house floor, and the bill died."
HB 24 came before the House Committee on Judiciary again in 2010,
"this time with several 'proposed modifications' to address the prosecutors' concerns, including how the Rules would be interpreted by courts and

72. Id.; Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 5.
73. Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 5. HB 24 was aptly named since its largest impact
was to Title 24 of the code, as more fully examined below.
74.

Id.; see also Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 60

MERCER L. REV. 135 (2008) (claiming that the proposed rules "did not receive serious
attention in the 2008 session of the General Assembly").
75. Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 5.
76. Id. at 5-6.
77. Id. at 7.
78. Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
79. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
80. See Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 8 (noting that the head of the Georgia
Association of Solicitors-General argued that adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
would not allow prosecutors to admit a defendant's prior DUI convictions in any of the
defendant's subsequent DUI cases, as a review of other states adopting the Federal Rules
of Evidence were not permitted to do so).
81.

Id.
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practitioners."82 Fourteen proposed amendments were outlined for the
committee, and several substantive and procedural changes were
debated.m Perhaps the most significant compromise with prosecutors
was a new addition to proposed O.C.G.A. § 24-4-417,8 clarifying that
a defendant's prior DUI convictions and arrests could be used in subsequent DUI prosecutions of the same defendant.
Compromise was reached with regard to other provisions, and HB 24
was read in the house and passed by a vote of 150 to 12 on March 17,
2010." On March 18, 2010, the senate read HB 24 and assigned it to
the Senate Judiciary Committee.87 During the first hearing on the bill,
several members of the committee expressed general concerns about the
bill, including a concern that it "appeared HB 24 enacted 'substantially
more' than just the [Federal Rules of Evidence], touching on many areas
outside Title 24.",88 Though one committee member urged the other
members to table the bill in light of these concerns, the bill was
favorably reported, and the senate read HB 24 for a second time on April
24, 2010.89 However, no one requested that the bill be brought to the
floor for a vote by the full senate, and thus the bill stalled again.9 o
HB 24 was revived in the 2011 legislative session, marking the state's
third attempt in three sessions to amend the Georgia Evidence Code.
The same bill that died in the senate without a vote in the 2010
legislative session was reintroduced, with the only change being the
effective date, which was pushed from January 1, 2012, to January 1,
2013, to reflect the legislative year gap in passing the rules." As the
82. Id. at 9 (citation omitted).
83. Id.
84. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-417 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
85. See Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 9-10.
86. Id. at 11.
87. Id. at 11-12.
88. Id. at 12 (citing remarks by Senator John Wiles (R-37th) and noting that the
discussions expressed in the Senate Judiciary Committee were analogous to the discussions
in the House Judiciary Committee).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Feb. 8, 2011 House J. Comm. Video, supra note 24, at 35m (remarks by Rep.
Wendell Willard (R-49th)); Ga. H.R. Bill 24, Reg. Sess (2010) (unenacted), available at
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-US/display.aspx?Legislation=25890 (noting Jan. 1,
2012, effective date); Ga. H.R. Bill 24, Reg. Sess. (initial draft presented to the house in the
2011-2012 session),availableathttp://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-US/displaydoc.aspx?
doc=http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20112012/108057.pdf [hereinafter 2011 Draft HB
241 (noting Jan. 1, 2013, effective date). Representative Willard, one of six house
representatives who sponsored HB 24 for the 2011 legislative session, asked the clerk to
keep the bill number (24) the same as in previous years. Feb. 8, 2011 House J. Comm.
Video, supra note 24, at 35m.
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bill was vetted and debated extensively in previous years, only two
proposed amendments were sent to the House Committee on Judiciary
along with the bill for consideration.9 2 Indeed, during the hearing
various proponents spoke to note the widespread and overwhelming
support for the bill, with the Vice-Chair of the Evidence Committee of
the State Bar noting:
[T]his kind of unanimity among the state's lawyers is about as rare as
an albino solar eclipse . .. you just don't see it, but the time really has
come; the ease of use as a work tool of these rules for lawyers and
judges will lead to much greater predictability, much more efficiency,
and better justice really for all of Georgians."
The first amendment considered was to the proposed O.C.G.A. § 24-8804(b)(3),94 the statement-against-interest rule, and the amendment
advocated bringing that section in line with the amended language of
Federal Rule 804." As drafted, the statute tracked the language of
Federal Rule 804(bX3) that was effective until December 1, 2010, which
provided the following:
(b) The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant
is unavailable as a witness:
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of
its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary
interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal
liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another,
that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have
made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending
to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the

92. Feb. 8, 2011 House J. Comm. Video, supra note 24, at 20m (remarks by Rep.
Wendell Willard (R-49th)); Id. at 42m (remarks by Mike Jacobs (R-80th)) ("{Blecause the
bill has already been through the ringer with this committee and through the entire
legislative process and the study committee that existed prior to that, I don't think we need
to rehash the provisions of the bill.").
93. Id. at 45m. Opposition was only voiced by one speaker. Id. at 54m (remarks by
Robert Dudley, Esq.) (voicing concern, inter alia, that an overhaul of the entire evidence
provisions was unneeded and had uncalculated costs of retraining the bench and bar and
in having to litigate issues that had already been settled through previous decisions).
94. See 2011 Draft HB 24, supra note 91, § 2, at 1. 1207.
95. Feb. 8, 2011 House J. Comm. Video, supra note 24, at 36m (remarks by Prof. Paul
Milich) (noting "the consensus was, as we reached the end stage of this, that we would
track the Federal Rules of Evidence as much as possible so that there would be greater
certainty in state courts when they were using that language that was interpreted in other
jurisdictions, particularly the federal courts"); see also FED. R. EVID. 804.
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accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.'
The amendment proposed replacing that provision with the new
amended language of Federal Rule 804(bX3) that went into effect after
December 1, 2010, which provides the following:
(b) The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant
is unavailable as a witness:
(3) Statement against interest.-A statement that:
(A) a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made
only if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so
contrary to the declarant's proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so
great a tendency to invalidate the declarant's claim against someone
else or to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability; and
(B) is supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate
its trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends
to expose the declarant to criminal liability."
In sum, the effect of the 2010 amendment to Federal Rule 804(b)(3) was
to extend the "corroborating circumstances" requirement to declarations
against penal interest offered by the defense and the prosecution,
whereas the text of the former Federal Rule 804(bX3) only extended the
requirement to statements introduced by defendants."
The other proposed amendment was to the proposed O.C.G.A. § 15-11499 dealing with hearing-impaired and foreign language interpret-

96. FED. R. EVID. 804(bX3) (effective until Dec. 1, 2010); see also 2011 Draft HB 24,
supra note 91, § 2, at 11.1206-1212.
97. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3) (effective Dec. 1, 2010).
98.

Federal Evidence Review, Public Comment Period Opens on FRE 804(b)(3)

Amendment (PartIII), FEDERAL EVIDENCE REvIEW (Aug. 21, 2008, 1:06 AM), http://federal
Evidence.com/node/144. Despite the text's limitation, some courts applied the corroborating
requirement to statements introduced by the prosecution even before the amendment,
including the Eleventh Circuit. Feb. 8, 2011 House J. Comm. Video, supra note 24, at 37m
(remarks by Prof. Paul Milich) (pointing out that the Eleventh Circuit applied the rule to
statements introduced by the prosecution before Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) was
amended in advocating that the amendment to proposed O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804(b)(3) be
passed); see, e.g., United States v. Shukri, 207 F.3d 412, 417-18 (7th Cir. 2000). Of note,
the Federal Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules considered and rejected three other
changes to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(bX3) in light of conflicting court decisions,
including a change to make it applicable to civil cases and to define the meaning of
"corroborating circumstances." Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES (May 12,2008), availableat http://www.uscourt
The Georgia House
s.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/EV..Report.pdf.
Committee on Judiciary did not mention or debate these changes.
99. 2011 Draft HB 24, supra note 91, § 20.
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ers.oo The proposed amendment sought to strike paragraph (b), which
proponents of the amendment argued that, if left in, could be construed
to mean that only court-qualified-namely, someone who has gone
through certain testing and attained certification-interpreters would be
recognized in the courts, which was not intended."o1 Both amendments
were passed along with another non-substantive amendment, and the
committee unanimously voted to pass the bill.102 However, the bill was
recommitted to the committee for rehearing only a few days later to
change an inadvertent shall to may in the proposed O.C.G.A. § 24-8826,103 a recodification of Georgia's medical narrative statute, O.C.G.A.
§ 24-3-18.o' The amendment passed, and the bill went back up to the
house and then to the senate.'05
On April 14, 2011, the last day of the 2011 legislative session, the
senate passed HB 24 by a vote of 50 to 3, despite the threat of a pair of
last minute "poison pill" amendments proposed by Senator Bill Cowsert
(R-Athens) on the senate floor.10
The two proposed amendments

100.
Wendell
101.
102.
103.
104.

Feb. 8, 2011 House J. Comm. Video, supra note 24, at 39m (remarks by Rep.
Willard (R-49th)).
Id. at 40m.
Id. at 67m.
2011 Draft HB 24, supra note 91, § 2, at 1. 1283.
Video: Georgia House of Representatives Judiciary Committee Proceedings (Feb.

17, 2011), 55m, available at http://wwwl.legis.ga.gov/legis/201 1-2/house/Committees/judic
iary/judyArchives.htm [hereinafter Feb. 17, 2011 House J. Comm. Video] (remarks by Rep.
Wendell Willard (R-49th)) (likening the bill's subsequent appearance before the committee
to GROUNDHOG DAY, a movie where the main character wakes up on the same day
everyday). The statute at issue in its current form allows medical reports in narrative
form to be admitted as evidence and states that "[a] statement of the qualifications of the
person signing the report may be included as part of the basis for providing the information
contained therein. . . ." O.C.G.A. § 24-3-18 (2010) (emphasis added). In advocating for the
amendment, Bill Clark of the Georgia Trial Association remarked that the change from
may to shall had never been discussed amongst lawmakers and would create a new waive
of litigation where parties would seek to exclude the reports if a statement of the
qualifications was not included in the same. Feb. 17, 2011 House J. Comm. Video, supra,
at 3m (remarks by Bill Clark).
105. See Status History of Ga. H.R. Bill 24, Reg. Sess. (codified as amended in scattered
sections of tits. 24 to 35 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013)), http://www.legis.ga.gov/legis
lation/en-US/display/31996 [hereinafter Status History of HB 24].
106. Id.; Kathleen Baydala Joyner, Approval of Evidence Rules Rewrite Ends 20-year
Quest, FULTON CNTY. DAILY REP. 1 (Apr. 15, 2011).
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Georgia Governor Nathan Deal
failed with very little support.1 0 7
signed HB 24 into law on May 3, 2011.0s

D. The Application of Federal Precedent to the 2013 Georgia
Evidence Code
The new evidence code becomes effective on January 1, 2013, and
applies to any motion, hearing, or trial starting on or after that date,
even if the lawsuit was instituted before the effective date.o' A more
complex issue is what application, if any, federal precedent has to the
2013 Georgia Evidence Code. House Bill 24, Section 1, provides:
It is the intent of the General Assembly in enacting this Act to adopt
the Federal Rules of Evidence, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of
the United States and the United States circuit courts of appeal as of
January 1, 2013, to the extent that such interpretation is consistent
with the Constitution of Georgia. Where conflicts were found to exist
among the decisions of the various circuit courts of appeal interpreting
the [Flederal [Riules of [E]vidence, the General Assembly considered
the decisions of the [United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit.] "o
Section 1 of HB 24 appears to state that the Georgia General Assembly
intended to limit the application of federal precedent to the Federal
Rules adopted in the 2013 Georgia Evidence Code to precedent from the
United States Supreme Court and United States circuit courts of appeal
existing as of January 1, 2013, a position echoed by Rep. Wendell
Willard (R-49th) in his remarks to the House Judiciary Committee."'

107. Joyner, supra note 106, at 1, 5. Senator Cowsert is credited for holding the bill
up twice in the Senate. Id. He maintains a DUI defense and insurance defense practice
and has received criticism because his amendments were thought to be self-serving as they
would have benefited his legal practice directly. Id. The proposed amendments are
available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-US/display/31996 (follow "Senfloor amend
1AM 291055," "Senfloor amend 2AM 291054" hyperlinks).
108. Status History of HB 24, supra note 105. Deal served as President Pro Tempore,
the second highest position in the Georgia State Senate, from 1989 to 1990 and is credited
with being the former state senator "who first introduced changes to the 148-year-old
evidence rules two decades ago." Kathleen Baydala Joyner, Deal to Sign Bills at State Bar,
FULTON CNTY. DAILY REP. 1 (May 3, 2011).
109. The lag between the enactment date and the effective date, nearly a year and a
half, is intended to give "everyone time to become familiar [with the changes] and go to
seminars, etc .
" Joyner, supra note 108 (quoting Rep. Willard (R-49th)).
110. Ga. H.R. Bill 24, § 1, 11.18-24.
111. See Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 13, 17-18.
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Georgia Supreme Court precedent on statutory interpretation requires
Georgia courts to consider legislative intent.'12 However, the apparent
intent to adopt the interpretations of future judicial decisions handed
down between the enactment of HB 24 and January 1, 2013, is curious.
Even at the time of drafting this Article, the January 1, 2013 cut-off
date has not passed. It would make more sense for courts and practitioners to consider whether any peculiar judicial decision handed down in
the interim period was actually anticipated by the General Assembly
before assigning it a precedential value. Moreover, if a court follows the
stated legislative intent of HB 24, courts will be left in the unusual
situation of only being required to rely on federal decisions issued before
January 1, 2013, even though decisions on unsettled questions, including
potential Supreme Court pronouncements on circuit splits, might be
issued after January 1, 2013, and would be otherwise dispositive."x3
In one sense, the implication is that Georgia retains its sovereignty over
its citizens and can interpret the new code provisions however desired
so long as the interpretation is not in conflict with federal decisions
issued before and through January 1, 2013. On the other hand, by
permitting Georgia free interpretation, the very evils sought to be
amended by adopting the Federal Rules could manifest-namely,
inconsistency. 4 As a practical matter, nothing prohibits Georgia
courts from looking to federal judicial decisions issued after January 1,
2013, as persuasive authority.
Further, irrespective of whether Georgia courts adhere to the
legislative intent that they follow Eleventh Circuit precedent over other
circuit rulings, Georgia courts will also have to decide whether, if at all,
to follow federal district court decisions in the region over other circuit
court decisions where the Eleventh Circuit has not yet ruled. Additional
confusion could be created if parties seek to relitigate evidentiary issues

112. See Cox v. Fowler, 279 Ga. 501, 502, 614 S.E.2d 59, 60 (2005) ("The rules of
statutory interpretation demand that we attach significance to the Legislature's action in
removing the ...

limiting language.

.

..

In matters of statutory construction, we look

diligently for the General Assembly's intention, bearing in mind relevant old laws, evils
sought to be addressed and remedies interposed.") (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
113. The past and present sections of the Georgia Code on the qualification of expert
witnesses, O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(2010) and O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan.
1, 2013), respectively, also permit courts to look to federal decisions as an aid in statutory
interpretation.
114. For instance, proponents of adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence argued that
commerce would be attracted as businesses would know what to expect in Georgia courts.
This perceived benefit may be illusory.

20111

FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

19

after a Georgia court has ruled where the Eleventh Circuit reaches a
subsequent inconsistent ruling.

III. CH-CH-CH-CHANGES: CHANGES

TO THE GEORGIA EVIDENCE

CODE

Georgia's adoption of considerable portions of the Federal Rules of
Evidence has resulted in significant structural and substantive changes
to the Georgia Evidence Code in an effort to address the concerns
discussed infra.
Significant Structural Changes to the GeorgiaEvidence Code
The 2013 Georgia Evidence Code contains structural changes to the
process for admitting and excluding evidence and reorganizes the
Georgia Evidence Code, combining similar sections in Title 24 that were
previously disbursed throughout the Georgia Code. Title 24 of the
current code contains approximately 256 statutes among ten chapters,
whereas in the 2013 Georgia Evidence Code, Title 24 contains approximately 208 statutes (with just two being reserved) among fourteen
chapters."' The chapter titles and the statute numbering of the new
code reflect the articles and numbering of the Federal Rules, where
applicable.
The 2013 Georgia Evidence Code codifies and clarifies the common law
standard that permits a trial court to exclude evidence if the prejudicial
value of the evidence outweighs the substantive value.116 Specifically,
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-403117 provides that a trial court can exclude evidence
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice,
A.

115. The 2013 Georgia Evidence Code has fourteen Chapters: Chapter 1 (General
Provisions), Chapter 2 (Judicial Notice), Chapter 3 (Parol Evidence), Chapter 4 (Relevant
Evidence and its Limits), Chapter 5 (Privileges), Chapter 6 (Witnesses), Chapter 7
(Opinions and Expert Testimony), Chapter 8 (Hearsay), Chapter 9 (Authentication and
Identification), Chapter 10 (Best Evidence Rule), Chapter 11 (Establishment of Lost
Records), Chapter 12 (Medical and Other Confidential Information), Chapter 13 (Securing
Attendance of Witnesses and Production and Preservation of Evidence), and Chapter 14
(Proof Generally). As noted above, the Federal Rules are divided among eleven articles:
Article 1 (General Provisions), Article II (Judicial Notice), Article III (Presumptions in Civil
Actions and Proceedings), Article IV (Relevancy and Its Limits), Article V (Privileges),
Article VI (Witnesses), Article VII (Opinions and Expert Testimony), Article VIII (Hearsay),
Article IX (Authentication and Identification ), Article X (Contents of Writings, Recordings
and Photographs), and Article XI (Miscellaneous Rules).
116. See Jackson v. Heard, 264 Ga. App. 620, 621, 591 S.E.2d 487, 489 (2003) ("It is
true that a trial judge has the discretion to exclude even relevant evidence if the judge
finds that the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk that
its admission will unduly prejudice or mislead the jury or confuse the issues being tried.").
117. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-403 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
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confusion, or delay, except where a different evidence rule creates a
different standard.118
Currently, the Georgia Evidence Code permits juries to determine
whether confessions in criminal matters were voluntarily made after a
waiver of constitutional rights.'19 O.C.G.A. § 24-1-104(c) 120 of the
2013 Georgia Evidence Code states that "[ilearings on the admissibility
of confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of the hearing of the
jury," removing any residuary responsibility of the jury in deciding the
admissibility of evidence and leaving all questions of admissibility to the

judge. 12 1
By substantially adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence, the 2013
Georgia Evidence Code aggregates common rules from disparate sections
of the current Georgia Code. For example, rules on authentication of
evidence are presently scattered throughout the Georgia Code, including
at O.C.G.A. §§ 24-7-3 through 24-7-6,122 O.C.G.A. §§ 24-7-8 through 247-9,123 O.C.G.A. §§ 24-7-20 through 24-7-21,124 and O.C.G.A. § 24-724.125 Under the 2013 Georgia Evidence Code, the rules on authentication are consolidated in O.C.G.A. §§ 24-9-901 and 902.126
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-901(a) explains the authentication process: 'The
requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent
to admissibility shall be satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." 27
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-901(b) then provides "examples of authentication or
identification conforming with the requirements of this Code section,"
but notes that the examples are "[bly way of illustration only, and not
by way of limitation."2 8 Examples of what will sufficiently authenticate evidence includes testimony based on personal knowledge that
evidence is authentic and evidence that a document is publicly filed.'"
Rather than listing specific means for authenticating particular types of
evidence, O.C.G.A. §§ 24-9-901 and 902 provide a theoretical framework
for authenticating evidence, including electronically stored information,

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Murray v. State, 151 Ga. App. 122, 122, 258 S.E.2d 919, 919 (1979).
O.C.G.A. § 24-1-104(c) (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
Id.
O.C.G.A. §§ 24-7-3 to -6 (2010).
O.C.G.A. §§ 24-7-8 to -9 (2010).
O.C.G.A. §§ 24-7-20 to -21 (2010).
O.C.G.A. § 24-7-24 (2010); see also MILICH, supra note 5.
O.C.G.A. §§ 24-9-901 to -902 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-901(a).
Id. § 24-9-901(b).
Id. § 24-9-901(bX 1), (7).
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that is not limited to specifically enumerated types of evidence, allowing
greater flexibility to accommodate new types of evidence and providing
multiple means for authenticating a particular piece of evidence.
Significant Substantive Changes to the Georgia Evidence Code
The 2013 Georgia Evidence Code contains numerous substantive
changes to the rules of evidence in Georgia, including significant changes
to the introduction and exclusion of hearsay evidence, the best evidence
rule, the admissibility of testimony about a jury's exposure to extrajudicial information, and the admissibility of opinion-character testimony.
B.

1. Hearsay. One of the most significant changes in the 2013
Georgia Evidence Code is that a party must now object to alleged
hearsay evidence at a trial or evidentiary hearing to preserve the
objection on appeal.3 o Specifically, O.C.G.A. § 24-8-802'3' provides
that "if a party does not properly object to hearsay, the objection shall
be deemed waived, and the hearsay evidence shall be legal evidence and
admissible."'
Moreover, the concept of res gestae has been eliminated in favor of the
English language. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(1), (2), and (3)133 provide for
exceptions to the exclusion of evidence as hearsay for present sense
impressions, excited utterances, and statements about current mental,
emotional, and physical conditions.'34 O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(1) permits
the introduction of "[a] statement describing or explaining an event or
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition
or immediately thereafter;"3"' O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(2) allows "[a]
statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition;"a' and O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(3) allows "[a] statement of the
declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical
condition, such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and
bodily health . . . .""'

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.
Id.
O.C.G.A.
Id.
O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

§ 24-8-802 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
§ 24-8-802 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
§ 24-8-803(1) to -(3) (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
§ 24-8-803(1).
§ 24-8-803(2).
§ 24-8-803(3).
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Previously, a party's self-serving, out-of-court statements could not be
Pursuant to the 2013 Georgia Evidence
introduced into evidence."
Code, a party's own out-of-court statements are admissible, even if selfserving, if they come within a hearsay exception and are relevant.139
A jury can consider the self-serving nature of the statement, and such
evidence "may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any
evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant
had testified as a witness.""'
The 2013 Georgia Evidence Code now permits the introduction of
business records containing opinion testimony if the business record was
(1) "made at or near the time of the" opinion; (2) "made by, or from
information transmitted by, a person with personal knowledge and a
business duty to report;" (3) "kept in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity;" and (4) "it was the regular practice of that business
activity" to create the document.'' O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(6)142 further
provides that such information can be excluded if "the source of
information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack
of trustworthiness."143
Business records are now also admissible at trial by an authenticating
affidavit, rather than by in-person testimony, if the affidavit attests to
the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(6).144 However,
[a] party intending to offer a record into evidence under this paragraph
shall provide written notice of such intention to all adverse parties and
shall make the record and declaration available for inspection
sufficiently in advance of their offer into evidence to provide an adverse
party with a fair opportunity to challenge such record and declara-

tion.145

138. Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Davis, 226 Ga. 221, 224-25, 173 S.E.2d 691, 693 (1970)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted) ("It is a general rule that self-serving
declarations-that is, statements favorable to the interest of the declarant-are not admissible
in evidence as proof of the facts asserted, regardless of whether they were implied by acts
or conduct, were made orally, or where reduced to writing. The rule which renders selfserving statements inadmissible is the same in criminal prosecutions as in civil actions.
The vital objection to the admission of this kind of evidence is its hearsay character; the
phrase 'self-serving' does not describe an independent ground of objection.").
139. Milich & Ingram, supra note 22, at 32.
140. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-806 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
141. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(6) (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
142. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(6) (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
143. Id.

144.

O.C.G.A. § 24-9-902(11); see also O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(6).

145.

O.C.G.A.

§ 24-9-902(11).
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Under the heading of "Admissions by party-opponent," the 2013
Georgia Evidence Code broadens the standard for admitting statements
by agents and coconspirators.' 46 Currently, only statements by an
agent that were authorized by the principal may be admitted.'
Under the 2013 Georgia Evidence Code, O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(dX2)(C)14
allows the introduction of a statement if the agent was authorized to
make a statement "concerning the subject" of the statement,"4 and
O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(dX2)(D)15 0 allows the introduction of a statement
by an agent "concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or
employment, made during the existence of the relationship."15 '
O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(dX2XE)152 permits the introduction of "[a]
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy, including a statement made during the
concealment phase of a conspiracy." 3 Further, "[a] conspiracy need
not be charged in order to make a statement admissible under this
subparagraph.""'

If the declarant is unavailable, a prior statement against one's
interests can be admitted if such a statement is "[slupported by
corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate the trustworthiness of
the statement if it is offered in a criminal case as a statement that tends
to expose the declarant to criminal liability."'" Georgia courts have
generally examined statements against a declarant's penal interest
under the "necessity" exception to the hearsay rule to ultimately find
they are unreliable and, therefore, inadmissible except when a declarant
is available to testify."' But there is at least one Georgia case that

146. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(dX2) (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
147. Crankshaw v. Schweizer Mfg. Co., 1 Ga. App. 363, 371, 58 S.E. 222, 225 (1907)
("But it must first appear from the evidence that the agent is speaking within the scope
of his authority, and authorized to bind the principal by his sayings, before the principal
can be held bound thereby . . . .").
148. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(d)(2)(C).
149. Id.
150. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(dX2)(D).
151. Id.
152. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(d)(2)(E).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804(b)(3)(B) (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
156. See, e.g., Ramsay v. State, 220 Ga. App. 618, 626, 469 S.E.2d 814, 822 (1996).
[Wihile defendant urges that because the statements had indicia of reliability
because they were against the penal interests of the declarants, this contention
is contrary to the long standing position of Georgia's appellate courts that
declarations, to third persons against the declarant's penal interest, to the effect
that the declarant, and not the accused, was the actual perpetrator of the offense,
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held declarations against penal interest were admissible as trustworthy
when they were made to close family members.'
2. Best Evidence Rule. The 2013 Georgia Evidence Code
specifically provides that a duplicate of a document may be introduced
"to the same extent as an original unless: (1) [a] genuine question is
raised as to the authenticity of the original; or (2) [a] circumstance exists
where it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the origiFurther, the 2013 Georgia Evidence Code now defines the
nal."'
terms "[wiriting" and "recording" to include a "magnetic impulse, or
mechanical or electronic recording or other form of data compilation,"
providing a significant update to the current Georgia Evidence Code to
account for technological changes." 9
3. A Juror Can Testify About a Jury's Exposure to Extrajudicial Evidence. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-606(b)" provides that though a
juror cannot testify about a jury's deliberations, "a juror may testify on
the question of whether extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the juror's attention, whether any outside
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or whether
there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form. "1i61

are not reliable but likely to reflect an attempt to subvert justice. Thus, such
statements are inadmissible except when the declarant is available to testify.
Id.
157. See Jackson v. State, 288 Ga. 213, 215, 702 S.E.2d 201, 204 (2010) (finding
statements against interest were admissible because the statements had "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness, including the fact that they were made to close family
members and the fact that they were statements against the victim's interest inasmuch as
the victim was admitting to a crime"). In evaluating whether hearsay can be admitted
under Federal Rule 804(b)(3), the Eleventh Circuit employs "a three-prong test for the
admission of statements against interest in criminal cases: (1) the declarant must be
unavailable; (2) the statement must be against the declarant's penal interest; and (3)
corroborating circumstances must clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement."
United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1288 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v.
Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). With
regard to the third prong, the Eleventh Circuit has held, "'in determining trustworthiness,
the [district] court should determine what the possibility was that the declarant fabricated
the statement. In other words, it must be unlikely, judging from the circumstances, that
the statement was fabricated' if we are to deem the third prong of the Rule 804(b)(3) test
satisfied." Id. (quoting United States v. Gomez, 927 F.2d 1530, 1536 (11th Cir. 1991)).
158. O.C.G.A. § 24-10-1003 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
159. O.C.G.A. § 24-10-1001(1) (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
160. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-606(b) (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
161.

Id.
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4. Character Witness Opinion Testimony is Permitted.
Presently, a single individual's opinion of a person's character is
inadmissible.1 12 The 2013 Georgia Evidence Code O.C.G.A. § 24-4405(a)163 provides that "[iln all proceedings in which evidence of
character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof shall be
made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an
Similarly, O.C.G.A. § 24-6-608(a) 16 s provides that the
opinion.""
"credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the
form of opinion or reputation," if the evidence only refers to the
"character for truthfulness or untruthfulness" and "the character of the
witness for truthfulness has been attacked . . . .166 O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4405167 and 24-6-608168 provide that character-witness testimony
based on reputation is still allowed. 169
5. Expert Witnesses. Previously, O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1"70 "codified
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 36 (1993), and added additional
requirements for the admission of expert testimony in medical malpractice actions."171 O.C.G.A. §§ 24-7-702 and 703,172 with only very
minor changes, repeat verbatim the language of O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1.

162. Taylor v. State, 176 Ga. App. 567, 571, 336 S.E.2d 832, 836 (1985) ("Under Georgia
law, the opinion of the witness as to the defendant's true character, whether he is in fact
a 'good' or 'bad' person, is regarded as irrelevant when what is sought to be proved is a
person's 'character.' That is because it is his reputation in the community which is
regarded as best establishing what that actual and intrinsic character is and thus what one
person (the witness) thinks of him does not show what his reputation in the community is
even though that person's sole private opinion constitutes a contributing part, i.e., one vote,
in the composite of personal opinions which comprise the person's standing or reputation
in the community.").
163. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-405(a) (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
164. Id.
165. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-608(a) (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
166. Id.
167. O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-405 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
168. O.C.G.A. §§ 24-6-608 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
169. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 24-4-405.
170. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (2010).
171. 2009 Treadwell, supra note 64, at 145 n.78; see also O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1.
172. O.C.G.A. §§ 24-7-702 to -703 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
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IV. REBEL REBEL: WHERE THE NEW GEORGIA RULES DEPART FROM
THE FEDERAL RULES

The passage of HB 24 was an exciting development for Georgia
lawyers familiar with the Federal Rules of Evidence, but it was perhaps
wishful thinking to assume Georgia's version of the Federal Rules would
bring clarity without confusion. While HB 24, in substance, adopted
much of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Georgia has also meticulously
edited almost every single rule, rewording introductory clauses, changing
conjunctive phrases ("such as" becomes "including, but not limited to" for
example), replacing "is" with "shall be," and so forth. It is not entirely
clear that each of these changes will be held to be superficial in every
circumstance."' As such, when faced with a significant evidentiary
dispute, it would be prudent to compare the specific language of the
Federal Rule and the corresponding Georgia rule. That said, it is
outside the scope of this Article to discuss every instance where the redraft has changed "or" to "and/or," or something similar. Moreover, the
new code has over three times as many rules as the Federal Rules of
Evidence, begging the question whether attorneys will find the new code
as accessible as the Federal Rules.
More significantly, according to HB 24, the General Assembly has
made substantive revisions to the Federal Rules adopted in HB 24 in
two main circumstances: first, where a Federal Rule has been interpreted by a significant judicial decision; and second, where a Federal Rule
is perceived to be silent on a point of law where the former Georgia
Evidence Code has a specific rule. 17 4 In the latter circumstance, the
Georgia rule was often retained, as shown below. In other circumstances
where the Federal Rules would have simply deferred to Georgia law,
such as the rules respecting privilege, the Georgia rules were retained
for obvious reasons. Below, we discuss what we perceive to be the most
significant differences between the Federal Rules of Evidence and the
2013 Georgia Evidence Code.
JudicialNotice
Federal Rule 201 concerns judicial notice of facts,' 5 a subject on
which Georgia already has fairly specific rules, some of which it has

A.

173. Indeed, it makes little sense for a legislative body to waste time rewording wellknown statutes if they are intended to conform exactly to their original meaning.
174. Ga. H.R. Bill 24, § 1, at 11.19-29.
175. See FED. R. EVID. 201.
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decided to retain."'
For example, Georgia has an existing rule
concerning judicial notice of facts contained in certified public records
which does not appear in the corresponding Federal Rule.177 Generally, in adopting Federal Rule 201, the General Assembly took a threepronged approach. First, Federal Rule 201, concerning judicial notice of
adjudicative facts, has been adopted in its entirety with a variety of
apparent stylistic revisions."' Second, the General Assembly added
O.C.G.A. § 24-2-220,' concerning judicial notice of matters respecting
the laws and sovereignty of states and nations.180 Third, the General
Assembly added O.C.G.A. § 24-2-221,81 concerning judicial notice of
county and municipal records and laws.8 2 The latter two rules are
vestiges of the former Georgia Evidence Code that do not appear in the
Federal Rules." The overall effect is to amend Georgia's general rule
regarding judicial notice of adjudicative facts to conform to Federal Rule
201 but to leave the other specific Georgia rules respecting judicial
notice in place.
B.

Presumptions in Civil Actions
Article III of the Federal Rules of Evidence deals with presumptions
of fact in civil actions' and has not been adopted by the Georgia
General Assembly. Federal Rule of Evidence 302 requires federal courts
to follow state laws respecting presumptions of fact,"8 s and there would
obviously be no need for this rule in Georgia. Federal Rule of Evidence
301 more generally concerns the shifting burden of proof created by a
presumption. 1'
Georgia has not adopted anything analogous to
Federal Rule of Evidence 301. Thus, instead, Georgia addresses
particular presumptions of fact in a series of rules codified in the new
O.C.G.A. §§ 24-14-20 through 24-14-29.187 Respecting the shifting
burden of proof, Georgia's new rules of evidence are mostly silent,

176. See O.C.G.A. §§ 24-7-20 to -27 (2010).
177. O.C.G.A. § 24-7-20.
178. O.C.G.A. § 24-2-201 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
179. O.C.G.A. § 24-2-220 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
180. Id.
181. O.C.G.A. § 24-2-221 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
182. Id.
183. For example, compare the 2013 Georgia Evidence Code's O.C.G.A. § 24-2-220 with
O.C.G.A. § 24-1-4 (2010).
184. See FED. R. EVID. 301, 302.
185. FED. R. EVID. 302.
186. FED. R. EVID. 301.
187. See O.C.G.A. §§ 24-14-20 to -29 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
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indicating only that certain presumptions "may be rebutted by proof"'
and that the determination of whether a presumption has been rebutted
"shall be exclusively questions for the jury, to be decided by the ordinary
test of human experience."" 9 Thus, instead of adopting the more
general Federal Rule, Georgia has apparently chosen to rely on its
common law. This is confusing because, in Miller v. Miller,'90 the
Georgia Supreme Court fashioned the common law by specific reference
to Federal Rule 301.191 In Miller, the Georgia Supreme Court noted
that the rules respecting presumptions are confusing and concluded that
Georgia law is clarified by Federal Rule 301, although Federal Rule 301
had not been expressly adopted in Georgia.192
Additional confusion is perhaps created because Federal Rule 301 is
scheduled to be amended on December 1, 2011,9 and it is not clear
how this amendment will affect the Miller decision. Currently, Federal
Rule 301 states:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act
of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party
against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence
to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the
burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which
remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally
cast.194
Absent contrary congressional action, this rule will be amended as of
December 1, 2011, to read:

188. O.C.G.A. § 24-14-21.
189. O.C.G.A. § 24-14-20.
190. 258 Ga. 168, 366 S.E.2d 682 (1988).
191. Id. at 169-70, 366 S.E.2d at 683. In Miller, the Georgia Supreme Court held:
Concerning the effect of a presumption on the burden of proof, the rule, generally,
is that while a presumption operating in favor of the party having the ultimate
burden of persuasion requires the opposing party to go forward with evidence
rebutting the presumption, it does not shift the original burden of persuasion.
That burden remains with the party upon whom it was originally cast. Language
in cases such as Wilkins v. Departmentof Human Resources, 255 Ga. 230, 234, 337

S.E.2d 20 (1985) and Morgan v. State, 172 Ga. App. 375, 376, 323 S.E.2d 620
(1984), relied upon by the wife, must be read with this principle in mind. While
this principle has not been expressly adopted in this state, by statute or otherwise,
we find no conflict between it and any of our statutes or case law.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
192. 258 Ga. at 170, 366 S.E.2d at 683.
193. See FED. R. EVID. 301; see also Pending Rules Amendments, ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (Aug. 2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/rulesandpolicies/federalrulemaking/pendingrules.aspx.
194. FED. R. EVID. 301.
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In a civil case, unless a federal statute or these rules provide otherwise, the party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden
of producing evidence to rebut the presumption. But this rule does not
shift the burden of persuasion, which remains on the party who had it
originally.
According to the Advisory Committee, the Federal Rule is intended to
shift the burden of proof as to a specific fact, but not the overall burden
of proof or persuasion for a cause of action."' In Georgia, prudence
suggests looking to the Miller decision for a statement of policy.
Nonetheless, it seems important to carefully inspect Georgia's common
law, as well as the plain language of Georgia's rules respecting specific
presumptions of fact, in situations where presumptions become
important. For whatever reason, it appears the General Assembly did
not share the Georgia Supreme Court's desire to adopt Federal Rule 301.

C.

ParolEvidence

In place of Article III of the Federal Rules concerning presumptions
and burdens of proof, the 2013 Georgia Evidence Code contains Chapter
3, O.C.G.A. §§ 24-3-1 through 24-3-10,"' which is a codification of
A substantive discussion of Georgia's
Georgia's parol evidence rule."
parol evidence rule is outside the scope of this Article, but it is worth
noting that the rule can now be found in the new rules of evidence.

D.

Relevance

1. Character Evidence - Crimes, Wrongs, and Acts. A majority
of Article IV of the Federal Rules concerning relevance and its limits has
been adopted by Georgia," but a few possibly significant changes
should be noted. First, Federal Rule 404(b) concerns the use of evidence
of a person's crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove their character and to
prove action in conformity therewith.2 00 Both the Federal Rule and its
Georgia analog, new O.C.G.A. § 24-2-404(b), 201 make this "bad act"

195. See Pending Rules Amendments, supra note 192 (follow "Amendments Approved
by Supreme Court" hyperlink; then follow "Excerpt on the Report of the Advisory
Committee on Evidence Rules" hyperlink).
196. Id.
197. O.C.G.A. §§ 24-3-1 to -10 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
198.

See id.

199.

See generally O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-401 to -417 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).

200.
201.

FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
O.C.G.A. § 24-2-404(b) (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
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character evidence generally inadmissible, and both enumerate certain
circumstances as exceptions in which the evidence may be admitted.202
In criminal prosecutions, both rules generally require-upon reasonable
request-advance notice from the prosecution to the accused of its intent
to use "bad act" evidence. 2 03 The new Georgia rule, however, contains
an additional sentence to identify circumstances under which the
prosecution does not need to provide this advance notice.204
Specifically, the Federal Rule states, in relevant part: "[Ulpon request
by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such
evidence it intends to introduce at trial."2 05 The corollary Georgia rule
states as follows, with the differences in bold text:
The prosecution in a criminal proceeding shall provide reasonable
notice to the defense in advance of trial, [deleted "or during trial"]
unless pretrial notice is excused by the court upon good cause shown,
of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at
trial. Notice shall not be required when the evidence of prior
crimes, wrongs, or acts is offered to prove the circumstances
immediately surrounding the charged crime, motive, or prior
difficulties between the accused and the alleged victim.206
Additionally, if pretrial notice is excused by the judge, the Georgia
rule, unlike the Federal Rule, does not appear to require reasonable
"during trial" notice of intent to use character evidence.2 07 Also,
Georgia's rule excuses notice in circumstances where the character
evidence "is offered to prove the circumstances immediately surrounding
the charged crime, motive, or prior difficulties between the accused and
the alleged victim."20 ' This distinction appears to be consistent with
existing Georgia case law, which holds that evidence of motive,
circumstances immediately surrounding the crime, and prior difficulties
between the accused and the victim are relevant and admissible, even
if they incidentally place the accused's character at issue.2 09

202. Compare FED. R. EVID. 404(b), with O.C.G.A. 24-4-404(b).
203. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b); O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404(b).
204. See O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404(b).
205. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
206. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404(b).
207. Compare FED. R. EVID. 404(b), with O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404(b).
208. O.C.G.A. 24-4-404(b).
209. See, e.g., Cawthon v. State, 289 Ga. 507, 508 n.2, 713 S.E.2d 388, 391 n.2 (2011)
(noting character evidence was relevant to the accused's "motive for the attack, and thus
was not rendered inadmissible merely by incidentally placing his character in issue");
Shields v. State, 203 Ga. App. 538, 539, 417 S.E.2d 168, 169 (1992) (holding state may
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2. Subsequent Remedial Measures. Federal Rule 407 concerns
the general inadmissibility of "subsequent remedial measures" to prove
liability and the exceptions to this rule. 210 Georgia has adopted the
The
rule in new O.C.G.A. § 24-4-407211 with one main difference. 1
new Georgia rule allows evidence of subsequent remedial measures to
prove product liability,213 whereas the Federal Rule explicitly does
All other modifications to Federal Rule 407 as adopted in
not."
Georgia appear to be stylistic, such as the substitution of "including, but
1
not limited to" in place of "such as" in the final sentence."
3. Offers to Compromise. Federal Rule 408 concerns the general
admissibility of offers of settlement and compromise,21 s and the new
Georgia rule, O.C.G.A. § 24-4-408,217 is different enough that care
should be taken to distinguish the two.2 1s Specifically, Federal Rule
408 states as follows:
(a) Prohibited uses. - Evidence of the following is not admissible on
behalf of any party, when offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or
amount of a claim that was disputed as to validity or amount, or to
impeach through a prior inconsistent statement or contradiction:
(1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish-or accepting or
offering or promising to accept-a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and

inform jurors of all circumstances surrounding the commission of a crime, even if that
information incidentally places a defendant's character into issue); Lance v. State, 275 Ga.
11, 19, 560 S.E.2d 663, 674 (2002) ("The evidence of similar transactions and prior
difficulties admitted by the trial court did not impermissibly place [the defendant's]
character at issue.").
210. FED. R. EVID. 407.
211. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-407 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
212. See id.
213. Id.
214. FED. R. EVID. 407 ("evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove
... a defect in a product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction").
215. CompareFED. R. EVID. 407 ("This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence
of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership,
control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment."), with
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-407 ("The provisions of this Code section shall not require the exclusion
of evidence of remedial measures when offered for impeachment or for another purpose,
including, but not limited to, proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary
measures, if controverted.").
216. FED. R. EVID. 408.
217. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-408 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
218. Compare id., with FED. R. EVID. 408.
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(2) conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations regarding
the claim, except when offered in a criminal case and the negotiations
related to a claim by a public office or agency in the exercise of
regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority.
(b) Permitted uses. - This rule does not require exclusion if the
evidence is offered for purposes not prohibited by subdivision (a).
Examples of permissible purposes include proving a witness's bias or
prejudice; negating a contention of undue delay; and proving an effort
to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.219
By contrast, the new Georgia rule states as follows:
(a) Except as provided in Code Section 9-11-68, evidence of:
(1) Furnishing, offering, or promising to furnish; or
(2) Accepting, offering, or promising to accept
a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise
a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount shall not be
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of any claim or its amount.
(b) Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations
or mediation shall not be admissible.
(c) This Code section shall not require the exclusion of any evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of
compromise negotiations or mediation. This Code section shall not
require exclusion of evidence offered for another purpose, including, but
not limited to, proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negating a
contention of undue delay or abuse of process, or proving an effort to
obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.220
Traditionally, Georgia attorneys have understood that certain subtle
differences between the federal and Georgia rules respecting settlement
and compromise negotiations have required careful wording in settlement communications to accommodate both sets of rules. For example,
in Georgia state courts, an offer to settle will be admissible unless it
contains an offer to "compromise," in which case it becomes inadmissible.221 Under the Federal Rules, the Eleventh Circuit holds that offers
of "settlements" and "settlement negotiations" are generally inadmissible. 222 Thus, to protect one's settlement communication from admission into evidence in state court, an offer had to be styled and presented
as an "offer to compromise," whereas a mere "offer to settle" was most

219. FED. R. EVID. 408.
220. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-408.
221. Trickett v. Advanced Neuromodulation Sys., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1353 (S.D.
Ga. 2008) (applying Georgia law).
222. Lampliter Dinner Theater, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 1036, 1042 (11th
Cir. 1986) ("Well established case law and the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit the
introduction of settlements or settlement negotiations into evidence to prove liability.").
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likely inadmissible in federal court. If HB 24 was an attempt to
alleviate this federal/state distinction, the wording of the new Georgia
rule does not clearly demonstrate this intent.
Expressions of Benevolence in Medical Malpractice
4.
Cases. The Federal Rules do not appear to have an analog of Georgia's
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-416,223 which is a re-codification of a tort reform
statute that makes "any and all statements, affirmations, gestures,
activities, or conduct expressing regret, apology, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion, mistake, error, or a general sense of
benevolence" inadmissible to prove liability in a medical malpractice

case. 224
5. Admissibility of Prior Drunk Driving Incidents. The Federal
Rules do not have an analog of Georgia's new O.C.G.A. § 24-4-417,225
which, as noted above, concerns the admissibility of prior instances of
drunk driving 226 in prosecutions for violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6391.227

E. Privileges
For obvious reasons, the Georgia Rules of Evidence depart from the
Federal Rules respecting privilege.22 8 In federal question and criminal
cases, the Federal Rules direct the federal courts to apply federal
common law privilege rules.2 29 In diversity jurisdiction cases, federal
courts apply state law privilege rules. 2 30 Georgia has no need to adopt
the Federal Rule on this point because Georgia has already codified its
own privilege rules and has no need to adopt the federal common law.
Accordingly, instead of adopting Article V of the Federal Rules, Chapter

223.

O.C.G.A. § 24-4-416 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).

224.

Id.

225. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-417 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
226. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-417.
227. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 (2011).
228. Compare O.C.G.A. §§ 24-5-501 to -508 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013), with
FED. R. EVID. 501, 502.
229. FED. R. EVID. 501 ("[Tlhe privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience.").
230. Id. ("[I1n civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law.").
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5 of the new Georgia rules, O.C.G.A. §§ 24-5-501 through 24-5-508,231
codifies Georgia's rules respecting privilege.232
One curiosity found in the new Georgia privilege rules relates to the
clergy/practitioner privilege found in new O.C.G.A. § 24-5-502."
Notably, this rule is a revised version of existing O.C.G.A. § 24-9-22,
effective until January 1, 2013, and it enumerates a list of religious
faiths that are entitled to a clergy/practitioner privilege if the practitioner professes faith in the clergyman's religion. 235 The list omits
several major religions, including Mormonism and Islam."' Interestingly, the General Assembly went so far as to revise the words "Jewish
rabbi" in the existing rule to "Jewish minister or similar functionary" in
the new rule, but there is no indication that the General Assembly
considered updating the rule to be more inclusive generally. 237 It is
odd that the legislators would have bothered with amending this
language without considering a broader amendment, taking into
consideration recent federal court decisions concerning state preference
of one religious denomination over another.2 38 One wonders whether

231. O.C.G.A. §§ 24-5-501 to -508.
232. Id.
233. O.C.G.A. § 24-5-502.
234. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-22 (2010).
235. Compare O.C.G.A. § 24-9-22 (2010) ("Every communication made by any person
professing religious faith, seeking spiritual comfort, or seeking counseling to any Protestant
minister of the Gospel, any priest of the Roman Catholic faith, any priest of the Greek
Orthodox Catholic faith, any Jewish rabbi, or to any Christian or Jewish minister, by
whatever name called, shall be deemed privileged. No such minister, priest, or rabbi shall
disclose any communications made to him by any such person professing religious faith,
seeking spiritual guidance, or seeking counseling, nor shall such minister, priest, or rabbi
be competent or compellable to testify with reference to any such communication in any
court."), with new O.C.G.A. § 24-5-502 ("Every communication made by any person
professing religious faith, seeking spiritual comfort, or seeking counseling to any Protestant
minister of the Gospel, any priest of the Roman Catholic faith, any priest of the Greek
Orthodox Catholic faith, any Jewish rabbi, or any Christian or Jewish minister or similar
functionary, by whatever name called, shall be deemed privileged. No such minister, priest,
rabbi, or similar functionary shall disclose any communications made to him or her by any
such person professing religious faith, seeking spiritual guidance, or seeking counseling,
nor shall such minister, priest, rabbi, or similar functionary be competent or compellable
to testify with reference to any such communication in any court.").
236.

See id.

237. Id.
238. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion. . . ."); Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of
Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1542 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted) (explaining how the First Amendment's "prohibition of denominational preferences
is inextricably connected with the continuing vitality of" the freedom of religion).
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this rule would withstand a challenge based on the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 3 9
Witnesses and Competency
The first half of Article VI of the Federal Rules and Chapter 6 of the
new Georgia rules generally concern witnesses, oaths, and competency.240 Generally, the Federal Rules have been adopted by Georgia, but
there are a few minor differences that should be noted.
Under both sets of rules, a party is generally incompetent to testify to
a fact about which he lacks personal knowledge, but Georgia has carved
out an exception such that a party is competent to make an admission
regardless of whether a foundation for personal knowledge has been
laid.2 4' Greater care may therefore be required in Georgia courts
where a party could, theoretically, admit a damaging fact although he
lacks actual knowledge of the fact.
Regarding oaths and affirmations, Georgia has added provisions that
do not appear in the Federal Rules with respect to children and oaths to
be applied in child deprivation proceedings.24 2 Finally, language
interpreters in Georgia are subject to slightly different rules than they
would be under Federal Rule 604.243
F

1. Evidence of Character and Impeachment. Georgia's new
character and impeachment rules are largely uniform with the corresponding Federal Rules,244 with a few notable exceptions. Federal
Rule 608, concerning character and conduct of witnesses, 245 has been
adopted by Georgia, with the addition of the Georgia rule that extrinsic
evidence of the conduct of a witness is admissible to attack his or her
character for truthfulness if it tends to show bias toward a party.2"

239. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
240. Compare O.C.G.A. §§ 24-6-601 to -606 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013), with
FED. R. EVID. 601 to 606.
241. Compare FED. R. EVID. 602, with O.C.G.A. § 24-6-602.
242. See O.C.G.A. § 24-6-603(b).
243. Compare FED. R. EVID. 604, with O.C.G.A. § 24-6-604.
244. This is not a significant departure from existing Georgia law, as Georgia courts
have looked to federal case precedent for clarification of Georgia's impeachment rules in
the past. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 291 Ga. App. 795, 800, 662 S.E.2d 849, 854 (2008)
(examining former Fifth Circuit precedent in connection with Federal Rule 609 in
association with Georgia impeachment rules); see also 2009 Treadwell, supra note 64.
245. FED. R. EVID. 608.
246. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-608(b) (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013); Hendrix et al., supra
note 24, at 18.
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This exception is not specifically included in the Federal Rule, but has
been recognized by the Eleventh Circuit.247
Federal Rule 609(c), 2 48 as adopted and modified in Georgia, adds
"[elvidence of a final adjudication of guilt and subsequent discharge
under any first offender statute" to the list of criminal convictions that
cannot be admitted to impeach a witness." The Federal Rule only
bars admission of convictions which had been "the subject of a pardon,
annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure
o
based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted ....
a
firstunder
discharge
that
The General Assembly must have believed
offender statute did not obviously fall within the "other equivalent
procedure" language of the Federal Rule.
Federal Rule 609(d) generally makes juvenile convictions inadmissible
to impeach a witness.2 5 ' The Georgia version of this rule adds nolo
contendere pleas.25 2
2. Mode of Order of Witness Interrogation. Federal Rule 611
and the corresponding Georgia rule generally concern the mode and
order of witness interrogation and presentation.253 Georgia's new rule
demonstrates a significant diversion from the plain text of the Federal
Rule respecting both the scope of cross-examination and the amount of
discretion vested in the trial court to either permit leading questions on
direct examination or forbid them on cross-examination.2 5 4 On the
first point, the Georgia rule completely rejects the concept featured in
the Federal Rule that the scope of cross-examination should be limited
to "the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting
the credibility of the witness,"25 5 and instead permits every party to
make a "thorough and sifting cross-examination" on topics including
"any matter relevant to any issue in the proceeding." 25 6 On the second
point, the Georgia rule states that "[1]eading questions shall not be used

247. See FED. R. EVID. 608(b); cf. United States v. Corbin, 734 F.3d 643, 655 (11th Cir.
1984) (upholding exclusion of extrinsic act evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 608
unless the act tends to show bias toward a party).
248. FED. R. EVID. 609(c).
249. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-609(c) (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
250. See FED. R. EVID. 609(cX1).
251. FED. R. EVID. 609(d).
252. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-609(d) (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
253. CompareFED. R. EVID. 611, with new O.C.G.A. § 24-6-611 (Supp. 2011) (effective
Jan. 1, 2013).
254. Compare FED. R. EVID. 611, with new O.C.G.A. § 24-6-611.
255. FED. R. EVID. 611(b).
256. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-611(b).
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on the direct examination of a witness" and that "[olrdinarily leading
In both sentencquestions shall be permitted on cross-examination."
es, the Georgia rule replaces the word "should" with "shall," reflecting
an apparent intent to limit the trial court's discretion in this regard. 2 58
3. Writings Used to Refresh Recollection. Federal Rule 612 and
its analog in the new Georgia rules concern the use of writings to refresh
the recollection of a witness.25 Georgia has, for the most part, adopted
the Federal Rule, albeit with a large degree of stylistic revision that
makes the Georgia rule appear substantially longer than the Federal
Rule. 26 o The main substantive departure from the text of the Federal
Rule concerns the use of writings that are subject to attorney-client
privilege to refresh the recollection of a witness before trial. Specifically,
if the court orders the writing produced to the opposing party, the new
Georgia rule contains a provision stating that this production does not
constitute a waiver of the privilege.261
4. Prior Inconsistent and Consistent Statements. Federal Rule
613 concerns circumstances in which a witness's prior inconsistent
statements may be used to impeach him or her.26 2 Georgia has, with
minor stylistic revisions, adopted the Federal Rule but has added
O.C.G.A. § 24-6-613(c), respecting the admissibility of prior consistent
statements to be used for witness rehabilitation.2 63

257. Id. § 24-6-611(c).
258. Id.
259. Compare FED. R. EVID. 612, with O.C.G.A. § 24-6-612 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan.
1, 2013).
260. Id.
261. See O.C.G.A. § 24-6-612(b) ("If the writing used is protected by the attorney-client
privilege or as attorney work product under Code Section 9-11-26, use of the writing to
refresh recollection prior to the trial shall not constitute a waiver of that privilege or
protection.").
262. FED. R. EVID. 613.
263. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-613(c) (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
A prior consistent statement shall be admissible to rehabilitate a witness if the
prior consistent statement logically rebuts an attack made on the witness's
credibility. A general attack on a witness's credibility with evidence offered under
Code Section 24-6-608 or 24-6-609 shall not permit rehabilitation under this
subsection. If a prior consistent statement is offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against the witness of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive,
the prior consistent statement shall have been made before the alleged recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive arose.
Id.
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5. Witnesses Called by the Court. Federal Rule 614 generally
concerns a trial court's discretion to call witnesses either on its own
motion or at the suggestion of a party.2 6 4 The new Georgia rules of
evidence adopt a very restricted version of the rule, which appears to
reflect a preference for less court involvement in the presentation of
testimony.2 65 Specifically, the Federal Rule allows the trial court to
call "witnesses" of any variety, whereas the Georgia rule restricts the
trial court's ability to call witnesses without the consent of all parties to
three categories: (a) court appointed experts; (b) witnesses regarding the
competency of any party; or (c) child witnesses.6
6. Exclusion of Witnesses. Federal Rule 615, and its analog in the
new Georgia rules of evidence, concern the trial court's duty and
discretion-and the limits thereof-to exclude witnesses from hearing the
testimony of other witnesses.26 The new Georgia rule is, for the most
part, identical to the Federal Rule, except that in place of the Federal
Rule's catch-all exception that prohibits the court from excluding "a
person authorized by statute to be present," 6 ' Georgia has substituted
O.C.G.A. § 24-6-616,269 which prohibits the court from excluding a
victim of a crime from observing the trial. 27 0 This is partially consistent with federal law, which, through the Crime Victims Rights Act 271
and the Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997,272 prohibits federal
trial courts from excluding victims of crime from observing the testimony
of other witnesses,2 " although the federal statutes contain exceptions
where the trial court believes the victim's own testimony would be
"materially altered" by observing the testimony of other witnesses. 2 74

264. FED. R. EVID. 614.
265. See O.C.G.A. § 24-6-614 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
266. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-614(a).
267. Compare FED. R. EVID. 615, with O.C.G.A. §§ 24-6-615 to -616 (Supp. 2011)
(effective Jan. 1, 2013).
268. FED. R. EVID. 615(4).
269. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-616.
270. Id.; compare O.C.G.A. § 24-6-616, with O.C.G.A. § 24-6-615.
271. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006 & Supp. III 2010).
272. 18 U.S.C. § 3510 (2006).
273. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3771(aX3).
274. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(3) (a victim of a crime has "[tihe right not to be excluded
from any such public court proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear and
convincing evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered
if the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding"); 18 U.S.C. § 3510 (victim cannot
be excluded simply because observation of other witness testimony may prejudice his
victim impact statement during sentencing); United States v. McVeigh, 958 F. Supp. 512,
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Georgia's new rules appear to omit this exception, opting instead to favor
the victim's right to observe the proceedings.2 75
7. Miscellaneous Rules Concerning Witnesses. It should be
noted that Georgia has adopted several rules in Chapter 6 which are not
present in the Federal Rules, including O.C.G.A. §§ 24-6-620 through 246-623.276 These rules cover topics including the trier of fact's role in
determining the credibility of witnesses," impeachment by disproving
a witness's testimony,27 8 the relevance of a witness's feelings toward
or relationship to a party,27 9 and the state's obligation to be pleasant
to a witness when examining him.280
8. Georgia Rules Regarding the Hearing Impaired. Georgia has
a significant policy "to secure the rights of hearing impaired persons
Accordingly, rules respecting the conduct of proceedings
. . . ."281
involving a hearing impaired individual are codified in the new Georgia
evidence rules at O.C.G.A. §§ 24-6-650 through 24-6-658.282

G.

Opinion/Expert Testimony

Georgia has, for the most part, adopted the Federal Rules regarding
opinions and expert testimony.2 83
1. Opinion Testimony Concerning Value of Property. With
specific respect to market value testimony, the new Georgia evidence
rules add a section to Federal Rule 701,28 permitting a party to testify
to his or her opinion of the market value of an article of property "if he
or she has had an opportunity to form a reasoned opinion."8 This is

514-15 (D. Colo. 1997) (court may voir dire victim witnesses outside the presence of the
jury prior to delivery of their victim impact statements to detect and exclude testimony
that has been prejudiced by observation of the trial).
275. See O.C.G.A. § 24-6-616.
276. O.C.G.A. §§ 24-6-620 to -623 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
277. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-620.
278. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-621.
279. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-622.
280. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-623.
281. O.C.G.A. § 24-6-650 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
282. O.C.G.A. §§ 24-6-650 to -658 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1,2013). A full discussion
of these sections is outside the scope of this Article, but prudence suggests reviewing these
rules prior to conducting superior or state court cases involving a hearing impaired person.
283. See O.C.G.A. §§ 24-7-701 to -707 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
284. FED. R. EVID. 701.
285. O.C.G.A. § 24-7-701(b) ("A witness need not be an expert or dealer in an article
or property to testify as to its value if he or she has had an opportunity to form a reasoned

MERCER LAW REVIEW

40

[Vol. 63

a re-codification of Georgia's current code section: O.C.G.A. § 24-966.286

2. Expert Opinion Testimony. The plain text of the new O.C.G.A.
§ 24-7-702211 is drastically different and longer than Federal Rule
702,288 regarding the testimony of experts.289 However, the difference mostly concerns: (a) Georgia's requirement that an expert witness
testifying to a standard of care in a professional malpractice case be
appropriately credentialed; 29 0 and (b) Georgia's codification of the
federal case law found in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. ,291 and its progeny.29 2
3. Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings. In addition to
the other Federal Rules respecting expert testimony, Georgia has added
O.C.G.A. § 24-7-707,"9 which states that "[iun criminal proceedings,
the opinions of experts on any question of science, skill, trade, or like
questions shall always be admissible; and such opinions may be given on
2 4 which recodifies current law
the facts as proved by other witnesses,""
found at O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.295
H.

Hearsay

1. Definitions. Georgia's new Rule of Evidence O.C.G.A. § 24-8801,296 containing hearsay definitions, generally tracks the form and

opinion.").
286. See O.C.G.A. § 24-9-66 (2010); see also Dep't of Transp. v. Se. Timberlands, Inc.,
263 Ga. App. 805, 810, 589 S.E.2d 575, 581 (2003) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted) ("The question of whether a witness has established sufficient opportunity for
forming a correct opinion or has stated a proper basis for expressing an opinion is for the
trial court" and is reviewed by the court of appeals "for abuse of discretion.").
287. O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702.
288. FED. R. EVID. 702.
289. Compare O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702, with FED. R. EVID. 702.
290. See O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(c).
291. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
292. See O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(f) ("[In interpreting and applying this Code section, the
courts of this state may draw from the opinions of the United States Supreme Court in
Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Electric Co. v.
Joiner,522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael,526 U.S. 137 (1999); and

other cases in federal courts applying the standards announced by the United States
Supreme Court in these cases.").
293. O.C.G.A. § 24-7-707.
294. Id.
295. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67 (2010).
296. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
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The new rule
substance of the corresponding Federal Rule 801.'
adds definitions of "public official" and "public record" at the end of the
rule,' but the remainder of the rule mirrors its federal counterpart
with the exception of the two diversions discussed below.
Federal Rule 801(dX1) and O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(dX1) are similar
provisions that establish rules for using a witness's prior statements to
impeach or rehabilitate his credibility.299 As shown below, however,
Georgia's rule makes a significant departure to address the use of prior
statements to attack or bolster the credibility of a non-witness whose
out-of-court hearsay statement has (for whatever reason) been admitted
and heard by the jury.300
Under the Federal Rule, a witness's prior statement only qualifies as
nonhearsay if the declarant is available to testify and be cross-examined
about the prior statement at trial. 0' This makes sense, as the Federal
Rule assumes the out-of-court statement is being used to impeach or
rehabilitate a witness at trial.3 0 2 For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 801(dXl)(A) allows a witness to be impeached on cross-examination by his prior inconsistent testimony.30 3
The Georgia rule generally covers the same ground, although Georgia
has compressed Federal Rules of Evidence 801(dX1XA) and (B) into a
single section, O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(dX1XA).3 0 4 In addition, Georgia has
included O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(dX1XB) to account for circumstances where
a party wants to attack the credibility of a non-witness hearsay
declarant who has not testified or been made available for crossexamination.0 5 In relevant part, the new Georgia rule states:
If a hearsay statement is admitted and the declarant does not testify
at the trial or hearing, other out-of-court statements of the declarant
shall be admissible for the limited use of impeaching or rehabilitating
the credibility of the declarant, and not as substantive evidence, if the
other statements qualify as prior inconsistent statements or prior
consistent statements under [O.C.G.A. §] 24-6-613.306

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Compare FED. R. EVID. 801, with O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801.
O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(f) to (g).
Compare FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1), with O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(dXl).
See O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(dXl)(B).
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
See id.
FED. R. EVID. 801(dXl)(A).
Compare FED. R. EVID. 801(d)1XA)-(B), with O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(d)(1)(A).
O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(dXl)(B).
Id.
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Under this rule, which is similar to, but not as extensive as Federal Rule
of Evidence 806, the court is directed to admit other out-of-court
statements from the same hearsay declarant to impeach or rehabilitate
his or her credibility as long as, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-6-613,ao7
they qualify as prior inconsistent or consistent statements.aos
Under both the Federal Rule and the new Georgia rule, a party's own
statements are admissible against him as admissions, and are not
hearsay.'09 Under both rules, an admission made by a party's agent
is generally binding and admissible against the party.3 0 However,
Georgia creates an exception to this rule for statements made by "any
agent of the state in a criminal proceeding.""C
2. Hearsay Admissibility. Respecting the admissibility of hearsay,
the Federal and Georgia rules are, on their face, fairly different.31 2
Specifically, Federal Rule 802 states: "Hearsay is not admissible except
as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress."" 3 New
O.C.G.A. § 24-8-802 states: "Hearsay shall not be admissible except as
provided by this article; provided, however, that if a party does not
properly object to hearsay, the objection shall be deemed waived, and the
hearsay evidence shall be legal evidence and admissible."314 Notably,
the Georgia rule has eliminated the clause from the Federal Rule that
would have extended to the Georgia Supreme Court the authority to
supplement the statutory rules of evidence.31 ' Further, and as noted
above, Georgia has added a provision to O.C.G.A. § 24-8-8023"' explicitly stating that hearsay becomes legal and admissible evidence if a party

307. Id. § 24-6-613.
308. Id. § 24-8-801(d)(1XB); FED. R. EVID. 806; see also Brantley v. State, 177 Ga. App.
13, 16-17, 338 S.E.2d 694, 698 (1985) (recognizing the right to impeach hearsay declarants
with prior inconsistent testimony in Georgia, consistent with FED. R. EVID. 806).
309. Compare FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2), with O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(d)(2).
310. Compare FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2XD), with O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(d)(2)(D).
311. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(dX2)(D).
312. CompareFED. R. EVID. 802, with O.C.G.A. § 24-8-802 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan.
1, 2013).
313. FED. R. EVID. 802.
314. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-802.
315. See O.C.G.A. § 24-8-802.
316. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-802 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
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While this provision does not
fails to make a proper objection.'
recognizes it.31 8
precedent
federal
Rule,
Federal
appear in the
3. Declarant Available. With the exception of a large number of
apparent stylistic revisions, *1and a smaller number of minor revisions
focused on modernizing the rule to include reference to electronic
records,No Georgia has adopted Federal Rule 803 regarding exceptions
to the rule excluding hearsay when the declarant's availability is
immaterial.3 21 The most extensive revisions appear to have been made
to O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(6),322 regarding admissibility of business
records, but even these rather drastic revisions appear to be either
stylistic or the codification of judicial decisions interpreting the existing
rule. In the most obvious revision, an entire new final sentence has
been added to Georgia's version of Federal Rule 803(6), which states:
"Public records and reports shall be admissible under paragraph (8) of
this Code section and shall not be admissible under this paragraph." 2
This, however, merely codifies Eleventh Circuit precedent holding that
Federal Rule 803(6), regarding business records, "cannot be used as a
'back door' to introduce evidence that would not be admissible under
Rule 803(8)(B)."M' Thus, there appears to be no practical difference
between Federal Rule 803 and the new Georgia O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803,325
but the large number of "stylistic" changes to this rule could also be
viewed as an opportunity to argue that the General Assembly intended
to give the rule a different meaning.

317. Id.; see also Smith v. State, 123 Ga. App. 269, 270-73, 180 S.E.2d 556, 558-59.
318. See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 694 F.2d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 1982) (citation
omitted) ("Whether or not the above second-hand admission might properly have come in
under an exception to the hearsay rule we shall never know, since no objection was levelled
at it. This being so, it is settled law in our circuit that '[wihere there is no objection to
hearsay the jury may consider it for whatever value it may have.'").
319. Compare, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(11) (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013)
("Isitatements of birth"), with FED. R. EVID. 803(11) ("Isltatements of births").
320. See O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(18) (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013) (emphasis added)
("To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-examination,
statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets, whether published
electronically or in print. . . .").

321.

Compare O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013), with FED. R.

EvID. 803.
322. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(6).
323. Compare O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(6), with FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
324. United States v. Brown, 9 F.3d 907, 911 (11th Cir. 1993); see also United States

v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 68 (2d Cir. 1977).
325. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
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4. Declarant Unavailable. Georgia has, with the exception of a
large number of apparent stylistic revisions, adopted Federal Rule 804,
regarding exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay when the declarant
is unavailable to testify at trial."' One obvious substantive revision
concerns the use of deposition testimony at trial. Georgia adopted
Federal Rule 804(bX1), but added the following sentence: "If deposition
testimony is admissible under either the rules stated in Code section 911-32 or this Code section, it shall be admissible at trial in accordance
with the rules under which it was offered." 32 7 Thus, when examining
the admissibility of deposition testimony under Georgia's new hearsay
rule, it is also necessary to examine the admissibility of the deposition
testimony under the discovery rules pursuant to which the deposition
was taken.
5. Article 2 - A Random Collection of Georgia Rules. In
addition to the hearsay rules adapted from Federal Rules of Evidence,
Georgia has created an Article 2, which serves as a repository for
Georgia's current hearsay code sections that have no direct analogue in
the Federal Rules. These sections generally concern party admissions,28 confessions, 2 9 medical reports,330 and testimony of a child's description of sexual contact or physical abuse."' Article 2 contains several, but not all, of Georgia's particular hearsay exceptions. A
review of the new Code sections beginning with O.C.G.A. § 24-8-820332
is advisable if you are looking for a particular former Georgia hearsay
rule.
6. Authentication and Identification of Documents. Chapter
9 of the new Georgia rules of evidence contains an adaptation of Article
IX of the Federal Rules, governing authentication and identification of
documents.'
In addition to analogs of the Federal Rules, Georgia has

326. Compare O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013), with FED. R.
EvID. 804.
327. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804(bX1).

328. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-821 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). It is not clear why this
exception is necessary at all, given that an admission in a pleading is expressly defined as
nonhearsay in O.C.G.A. § 24-8-801(d)(2XA). See also O.C.G.A. §§ 24-8-822 to -823 (Supp.
2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
329.

O.C.G.A.

§§

24-8-824 to -825 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).

330. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-826 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
331. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-820 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
332.
333.

Id.
Compare FED. R. EviD. 901, 902, and 903, with O.C.G.A.

(Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).

§§24-9-901

to -903
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inserted an Article 2, containing five sections addressing the means of
authentication for specific types of records and evidence, including: state
and county records;3 34 medical bills; 335 laws and records of other
states;336 photographs, video, and audio recordings;33 ' and driver
records. 3 " Each of these is an existing Georgia Code section, which
has been renumbered.
7. Lost Records. Article XI of the Federal Rules of Evidence
contains the "miscellaneous rules,""3 ' and has not been adopted by
Georgia. In its place, Georgia has included Chapter 11, Articles 1 and
2, respectively, containing its procedures for establishing duplicates of
lost or destroyed public recordsa 0 and for establishing duplicates of
lost or destroyed papers evidencing indebtedness. 341 A discussion of
the substance of these code sections is outside the scope of this Article.
8. Additional Chapters. In addition to the provisions adapted from
the Federal Rules of Evidence, the 2013 Georgia Evidence Code will
contain Chapters 12, 13, and 14,32 each containing multiple articles
and sections covering topics ranging from confidentiality of medical
records to payment of fees to witnesses appearing pursuant to subpoenas.34 3 A full discussion of these provisions is outside the scope of this
Article, but it should be noted that these additional provisions make up
approximately twenty-seven percent of the text of HB 24.'" Interestingly, the actual portion of HB 24 dedicated to the adaptation of the
Federal Rules of Evidence in Title 24 of the Georgia Code accounts for
less than forty percent of the legislation.34 5
334. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-920 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
335. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-921 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
336. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-922 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
337. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-923 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
338. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-924 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
339. See FED. R. EVID. 1101, 1102, and 1103.
340. O.C.G.A. §§ 24-11-1 to -3 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
341. O.C.G.A. §§ 24-11-20 to -29 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
342. See supra note 105.
343. See O.C.G.A. §§ 24-12-1 to -14-47 (Supp. 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
344. See id.
345. Sections 3-100 of HB 24 make up approximately thirty-four percent of the Act and
make modifications to other code sections residing within the Georgia Code, but outside
of Title 24. See also Hendrix et al., supra note 24, at 13-14, App., Table 1 (examining
House Bill 24 during the 2010 legislative session, which, as explained above, was virtually
the same bill that was finally enacted except as otherwise, and reporting that, in general,
these sections served to remove an evidence rule found in another statute, delete
unnecessary evidence rules, and/or update references to new sections in Title 24 of the 2013
Georgia Evidence Code).
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V. AFTER ALL
While there is certainly more to be said on many of these points, and
future rulings will provide even more fodder for discussion, we hope this
Article has provided a helpful overview of the New Georgia Rules of
Evidence and will be useful for your practice when the new rules take
effect on January 1, 2013.

